October 18, 1999

by Praful Bidwai

By giving the National Democratic Alliance a less-than-generous majority of 30 seats in the Lok Sabha, and sizing the Congress down to less than 115 seats, the electorate has delivered a discriminating, complex and regionally differentiated verdict. The outcome does not represent a decisive victory for the BJP, although Mr A.B. Vajpayee has become the only Prime Minister since 1971 to return to office in two consecutive elections. His swearing-in singularly lacked enthusiasm or élan. Sounds odd? Consider the following.

If you were a committed BJP cadre, you would admit there was a lot going for the party. There was the “sympathy” factor, at least according to the media, on account of the toppling of the BJP-led government by opponents with a single-vote majority, who could not put together a substitute. The Third Front had disintegrated and the Congress was barely in revival mode. There was Kargil, on top of Pokharan-II—just the right ingredients for a national chauvinist electoral plank. There was the Vajpayee “image”—for some, the Vajpayee “magic”. To top it all, there was the BJP’s shrewd alliance-building with a no-holds-barred combative campaign.

Despite this, the BJP failed to improve on its Lok Sabha tally. Its vote actually shrank by 2.5 per cent. Nor did it remotely secure an endorsement for its unique ideology. The party won as much by default as on account of positive votes—despite diluting its platform. The BJP’s victories on its own steam were limited to about 100 seats. The rest came from clever alliances.




As a hardcore sympathiser, you would feel bitter that the BJP and allies lost so badly—in Karnataka, Punjab, and above all, in Uttar Pradesh, the original, invincible, fort of Hindutva in the heart of Aryavarta. The BJP lost significant influence in the Hindi belt, and recovered it only partially by piggybacking on allies in the east and the south. In U.P., many factors—including four-way or three-way contests, a pliant or partial bureaucracy, and a split in Muslim votes between the SP and Congress—conspired to favour it. But the Vajpayee “magic” didn’t work. Nor did the post-Kargil “rebirth of nationalist India”, as Mr Advani put it. The campaign on “foreign origins” was supposed to appeal powerfully to India’s Salt-of-the-Earth. It fell flat on its face.




What happened? The voter saw through the cynicism of politicising Kargil. BJP factionalism took unprecedented dimensions, with Mr Kalyan Singh openly sabotaging the party’s campaign. Mr Vajpayee was reduced to dependence on street-corner meetings and film stars. The voter again did what s/he has been doing for a quarter-century: S/he threw out more than two-fifths of sitting MPs. The negative vote has been more important than positive support.




The verdict confirms many trends in Indian politics. Among these are growing regionalisation, declining importance of charisma-based politics and identity-related issues, and rising demand for accountability. The results reinforce long-term tendencies of self-assertion of Dalits and OBCs, and rising importance of secular-political choices for Muslims. They are also a warning that rulers should not take India’s discriminating electorate for granted.




Contrary to shibboleths, India is not evolving towards a bipolar or two-party system, but towards a more complex structure, to which regional parties are crucial. The BJP-Congress collective vote is just about half the total—and not rising. Indeed, their political strength has decreased. That is no sign of bipolarity. The BJP is not becoming what the Congress used to be until the early seventies. It still lacks the Congress’ regional-geographical spread. It remains estranged from and irrelevant to the concerns of the underprivileged. It has not reached out to the poor. Even at its non-peak level then, the Congress had 35 per cent of the vote and 300 to 350 seats. With 24 allies, the NDA commands just 300. The BJP’s own vote is only 23 per cent.






And yet, the results are a setback for the Centre-Left and for progressive causes. The plain truth is, an alliance dominated by the Hindu Right has come to power. The setback is highlighted especially by the Left’s decline. The CPI in particular has been marginalised to just four Lok Sabha seats, and wiped out in the Andhra assembly where it once had 30-plus seats. In general, the results shift the fulcrum of politics a little rightwards. The real trick in this election has been alliances. Whoever built coalitions wielded a massive advantage. They could pool their votes. That explains the BJP’s success in Andhra, Orissa and Assam, and its improved showing in Maharashtra where it must thank Mr Sharad Pawar. He rescued it and the drowning Sena by splitting secular votes at a critical juncture.




The BJP has made a mockery of political morality by shamelessly allying with forces with which it has nothing in common, and which committed what it considers the ultimate political violence: bringing down its government in April. This “party with a difference” has embraced the Meham-Chautala political model. But it has electorally gained. By contrast, the Congress has been a reluctant and tactless coalition-builder. It permitted itself the “Pachmarhi delusion”—viz that the mere beginning of its revival meant it could romp to power on its own.




The people have accepted and endorsed Ms Gandhi as an Indian citizen and leader of national stature: hence her convincing, largely effortless, victory in two constituencies. But they have not endorsed her as a political strategist. She has not yet forged the Congress into a fighting force which scores victory after decisive victory. She committed many tactical blunders: pulling down the Vajpayee government without ensuring an alternative would emerge; doing a terrible flip-flop in Haryana—costing itself all six seats—; and relying upon discredited sycophantic advisers like Messrs Pranab Mukherjee, R.K. Dhawan and Ghulam Nabi Azad.




However, it is wrong to believe that tactical blunders alone deprived the Congress of a sweet victory. The party started with an eroded base, and a rotten organisation, which it tried to rebuild by half-heartedly reaffirming secularism and pluralism, but without a radical revision either of economic policy or electoral strategy, itself rooted in faith in non-existent charisma. The Congress opted for shortcuts. It paid heavily. It foolishly imagined that Sonia would somehow metamorphose into the Indira of 1971 or 1980, and sweep the polls. The dynasty factor worked against the party, not for it. The Congress will have to do much more than a cosmetic resignation-at-the-top exercise, a la Mr Pranab Mukherjee. But that is another issue.




The NDA now seems set to rule with a bigger majority than 18 months ago. It has a higher probability of lasting than its predecessor. Greater numbers, however, do not make it inherently or structurally stable. There are many sources of threat to the new government, and numerous causes of friction. Although the NDA is potentially stronger than an ad hoc post-poll arrangement, it remains an office-driven, not ideologically motivated, or like-minded, formation. It has no ground-rules for power-sharing or dispute-resolution. It faces an inclusion problem. Mr Vajpayee will find it painfully difficult to handle his partners without creating rancour. The NDA has at least half a dozen leaders who can barely contain their Prime Ministerial ambitions. Cabinet management will prove even messier than Cabinet formation.




Then there is the problem of exclusion. The BJP failed to draw its single biggest ally, the Telugu Desam, into the Cabinet. This is because Mr Naidu feels threatened and does not like the stigma of association with communalism. For the past year, the BJP has tried hard to split his party and must be contained. If Mr Vajpayee includes “new” post-poll entrants into the Cabinet, he will have even more serious trouble with the NDA’s pre-poll constituents.




A third problem is ideological-political contradictions among NDA allies. These can take many forms: rivalry over river waters, attitudes to other parties and state governments, tensions between regional and Central agendas, clashing portfolios, and, of course, ego clashes There is no reason to believe that that party of highly temperamentally mavericks, the JD (U), will be less irascible and difficult to handle than the AIADMK, or that Ms Mamta Banerjee will miraculously turn reasonable. A certain instability is built into the dynamics of this polity. The NDA cannot be free of it.




The real issue is not how long the new coalition lasts, but what it does. In the short run, the NDA may do a lot for the Sensex, but little for the people. Its manifesto does not contain one iota of hope for the poor.  Its line is completely right-wing: starving public services of funds, promoting indiscriminate privatisation, and realigning the economy to the needs of the WTO and global capital, as well as encouraging authoritarian and majoritarian forms of rule. A frustrated BJP, seething with strife, could well be tempted to push an overtly communal agenda.. If its “secular” allies do not firmly resist this, this can only spell further trouble for India.. Will they  resist?